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Abstract: The Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) 
serves as the data source for official income, poverty, and inequality statistics in the United 
States.  There is a concern that the rise in nonresponse to earnings questions could deteriorate 
data quality and distort estimates of these important metrics.  We use a dataset of internal ASEC 
records matched to Social Security Detailed Earnings Records (DER) to study the impact of 
earnings nonresponse on estimates of poverty from 1997-2008.  Our analysis does not treat the 
administrative data as the “truth”; instead, we rely on information from both administrative and 
survey data.  We compare a “full response” poverty rate that assumes all ASEC respondents 
provided earnings data to the official poverty rate to gauge the nonresponse bias. On average, we 
find the nonresponse bias is about 1.0 percentage point. 
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The accurate measurement of income is vital to assessing economic growth, 
characterizing income poverty and inequality, gauging the effectiveness of the federal safety net, 
among other important applications.  The Current Population Survey Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (ASEC) serves as the official source of income and poverty statistics for 
the United States.  ASEC respondents may be reluctant to answer income questions, or indeed 
any questions, out of concern for response confidentiality, or they may just have insufficient 
knowledge of the answers (Groves 2001).  As seen in Figure 1, the nonresponse rate for ASEC 
earnings among workers (both item nonresponse and supplement nonresponse) has risen 
dramatically since the early 1990’s.  The earnings imputation rate has reached 20 percent (the 
line with squares), and nonresponse of the entire ASEC supplement adds an additional 10 
percentage points to make total nonresponse about 30 percent in a typical year over the past 
decade (the line with diamonds).1  Rates of item nonresponse for other earnings (e.g., self-
employment) trended upward in the 1990’s, but they only contribute 1-2 percentage points per 
year, implying most is due to wage and salary workers.2  Because earnings accounts for over 80 
percent of total income in national income accounts, failure to accurately measure it may 
significantly bias estimates of the income distribution. 
This paper assesses whether and to what extent there is bias in official poverty rates 
caused by earnings nonresponse.3  The poverty rate, which has been measured consistently since 
the late 1960s, is not only the key statistical barometer of the well being of low-income families 
in the U.S., but also is used in establishing the size of intergovernmental transfers for scores of 
                                                 
1 The flag for whole supplement nonresponse is not well known, and as shown in Figure 1 ignoring supplement 
nonresponse omits 1/3 of all imputations. 
2 For the years 1987-2011, the average share of earnings nonresponse due to wage and salary earnings is about 95 
percent while the average share of earnings nonresponse due to self-employment earnings is about 5 percent.   
3 Bias could also arise from nonresponse in other income sources used in constructing the poverty rate such as 
government transfer programs or private nonlabor income (e.g. retirement, rent/interest/dividends).  Rates of 
nonresponse in the ASEC among these other income sources generally range from 0.5 to 4 percent depending on 
source, and thus are much less common than earnings imputation.  
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programs.  For example, in 2006 the poverty rate was utilized by 39 federal programs to allocate 
billions of dollars of assistance to states, municipalities, and individuals (Gabe 2007).  Thus, 
knowledge of potential bias from earnings nonresponse is important as it could have substantive 
budgetary implications.  
The current approach of the U.S. Census Bureau is to retain earnings nonrespondents in 
the sample and to assign them earnings via a matched “donor” with similar demographic 
characteristics using a sequential “hot deck” procedure (Little and Rubin 2002).  The advantage 
of this approach is that with weights the sample retains population representativeness, there may 
be efficiency gains from retaining the whole sample, and it is less subject to specification error 
found in model-fitting approaches (Andridge and Little 2010).  However, the hot deck procedure 
may bias estimates of population statistics if the missing at random assumption does not hold 
(Bollinger and Hirsch 2013).  Hirsch and Shumacher (2004) and Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) 
study the hot deck procedure in both the ASEC and the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group, and show 
the hot deck procedure causes earnings regression parameters to be biased.  Given the bias in 
regression parameters there is a possibility the hot deck procedure could bias estimates of 
statistics derived from income such as poverty rates. 
We propose a new approach to address the effect of earnings nonresponse on the level 
and trend in poverty.  Similar to the hot deck approach we seek the missing counterfactual owing 
to nonresponse:  what would the poverty rate be if all nonrespondents reported their earnings?  
We consider a full response poverty rate from the ASEC to be the ideal estimator, abstracting 
from questions about definitions of income and measurement error.4 The ASEC has a long 
history, much of it characterized by high response rates.  Our approach allows researchers to 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Citro and Michael (1995), Ziliak (2006), Meyer and Sullivan (2012), and Short (2013) for 
discussion on income definitions and measurement error as pertains to poverty measurement.  
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track this long series and adjust for nonresponse as it worsens, rather than attempting to establish 
a new series.   
To estimate what we call the “full-response poverty rate,” we assemble a proprietary 
dataset of internal ASEC records matched to Social Security Detailed Earnings Records (DER) 
that covers survey years 1998-2009 and allows for the systematic study of long-term trends in 
income imputation and poverty rates.5  The DER file contains earnings from all jobs reported on 
a worker’s W-2 forms, including wages and salaries and income from self-employment subject 
to Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and/or Self-Employment Contributions Act 
(SECA) taxation.  The DER data are central to our analysis; however, our procedure does not 
treat the administrative data as correct or the “truth,” and in fact takes the rather surprising stance 
that the ASEC is the “ideal.”  While some research on wages has treated administrative records 
like the DER as correct (see Bound and Krueger (1991) and Bollinger (1998)), these analyses 
typically attempted to remove individuals whose characteristics (industry and occupation) were 
likely to indicate substantial under the table earnings. This approach will not work in estimation 
of poverty rates, since all individuals and families must be included.  Moreover, recent research 
(Roemer 2002; Abowd and Stinson 2013) has suggested that this is not necessarily an 
appropriate approach, and in fact, the alleged “over-reporting” of CPS earnings among low-
income persons may reflect actual earnings not in the DER such as unreported and/or uncovered 
earnings (both legal and illegal). 
Two major issues arise in establishing the full-response poverty series: the DER data 
differ from the ASEC data, and not all nonrespondents are matched to the DER records.  We can 
address these issues most simply by comparing ASEC poverty rates to DER poverty rates for 
                                                 
5 The ASEC was matched to the DER in 1991 and 1994, and annually since 1996.  With the CPS redesign in 1995 to 
all CATI/CAPI interviewing we begin with the 1998 survey year in order avoid changes in survey design affecting 
our analysis. 
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those who both report earnings to the ASEC and are matched to the DER.  This provides a 
simple correction to the DER poverty rates for those who fail to report earnings in the ASEC.  
Similarly, we can compare ASEC poverty rates for those who are matched to the DER and those 
who are not.  Doing so provides a correction to account for nonrespondents who are not matched. 
Together, the corrections provide an estimate of the “true” poverty rate that would emerge in the 
absence of earnings nonresponse. We also construct these corrections by demographic groups, 
thus allowing the correction to differ across groups with known differences in response rates.   
We compare our approach to several alternatives, drawing out important differences in 
the various assumptions and the attendant implications for the level and trend in poverty. For 
example, Nicholas and Wiseman (2009, 2010) and Turek, et al. (2012), each examine the effect 
of nonresponse on poverty in select years using what we call a “plug-in” approach. That is, they 
replace ASEC earnings with DER earnings, or the maximum of ASEC and DER earnings, to 
construct an alternative poverty series, finding little effect of earnings nonresponse on poverty.6  
Our full-response poverty rate and simple alternatives such as the plug-in method make different 
assumptions about the underlying data generating mechanism, specifically whether data are 
missing completely at random, missing at random, or whether nonresponse is related to earnings 
(missing nonrandomly).   
However, all of these approaches require access to the DER.  Consequently, we also 
examine methods available to researchers without access to the DER in lieu of the hot deck. 
These approaches include Manski (1989) bounds, simply removing all nonrespondents, and 
                                                 
6 In addition to our new method of accounting for nonresponse, our study differs from Nicholas and Wiseman (2009, 
2010), and Turek, et al (2012), in several ways.  First, we examine a longer time series.  Second, unlike Turek, et al. 
who focus only on persons with positive earnings, we examine the entire poverty universe. Third, consistent with the 
Census construction of poverty as a family concept, we derive measures of nonresponse at the family level. Fourth, 
we distinguish the contribution of matched versus unmatched, respondent versus nonrespondent, and working versus 
nonworking families to the poverty rate.   
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inverse probability weights.  As with the approaches using the DER, each non-DER alternative 
makes different sets of assumptions concerning the data generating process.  By comparing these 
approaches to the results using the DER, we highlight methods which provide similar results and 
provide researchers with an approach which mimics the results obtained using the DER data. 
Our results suggest that assumption of missing at random, even conditional on known 
characteristics, is not valid in modern data.  Hence any correction which assumes missing 
completely at random or missing at random, such as the hot deck procedure, is likely to be 
biased.  We show that the ASEC underestimates the number of persons in poverty by an average 
of about 1.0 percentage point.7 
II. Poverty, Nonresponse, and Linked Administrative Data 
The official poverty rate is based both on the actual earnings of those persons who 
respond to the ASEC earnings questions along with the imputed earnings of those persons who 
do not respond to the ASEC earnings questions.  The poverty rate can be written as a weighted 
average of these two groups: 
(1) 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅} + 𝑃𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅}, 
where 𝑃𝐶  is the official Census poverty rate, 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  is the poverty rate among respondents (R) to 
ASEC earnings, Pr{𝑅} is the probability of earnings response, 𝑃𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  is the poverty rate among 
nonrespondents (NR) to ASEC earnings, and Pr{𝑁𝑅} is the probability of nonresponse.  The 
ASEC data provide consistent estimates of three of the terms on the right hand side: 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 , 
Pr{𝑅}, and Pr{𝑁𝑅}.  The term 𝑃𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  is not identified in the ASEC data, and thus the current 
Census practice is to implement the hot deck procedure described in detail below to replace the 
missing earnings in order to derive an estimate of poverty.  Our goal is to assess how earnings 
                                                 
7 The Results Section (Section V) describes the test for this main finding. 
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nonresponse affects the official poverty rate in the ASEC.  In the terminology of the program 
evaluation literature, we are missing the counterfactual—what would the poverty rate be if 
nonrespondents had responded to the earnings questions?   
A point of departure for our analysis is to consider the extreme bounds cases motivated 
by the work of Manski (1989).  Because the poverty rate falls between 0 and 1 we can place 
bounds on the official series by making the polar assumptions that the poverty rate among 
nonrespondents is 0 or the poverty rate among nonrespondents is 1.  A nonrespondent poverty 
rate of 0 gives the lower bound (best case poverty scenario), or 
(2) 𝑃𝐿𝐵 = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅} + 0 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅} = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr (𝑅), 
while a nonrespondent poverty rate of 1 gives the upper bound (worst case poverty scenario), or 
(3) 𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅} + 1 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅} = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅} + Pr{𝑁𝑅}. 
In Figure 2 we plot the upper and lower bounds against the official poverty rate.  As can be seen, 
the lower bound is closer to the official rate than the upper bound.  The lower bound differs from 
the official rate by about 3 percentage points.  However, the upper bound is over three times the 
official rate.  In both cases, they differ statistically from the official rate at the 5 percent level. 
[Figure 2 here] 
The Manski bounds are extreme because they assume we know nothing about the poverty 
status of nonrespondents.  In fact, we know a lot about nonrespondents as we have linked 
administrative data on their earnings from the DER.  With these data we seek to identify the 
missing counterfactual and establish a benchmark “full response” poverty rate, 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙, that is 
more informative than the Manski upper bound.  In constructing 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 we must address the fact 
that earnings in the DER differ from those in the ASEC and that not all respondents in the ASEC 
have a linked record in the DER.  Specifically, ASEC earnings reports can differ from DER 
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reports both because not all jobs are covered by Social Security and thus not required to be 
recorded in the DER, and that “under the table” earnings could be reported to the ASEC that are 
not reported to the IRS.  There is evidence that “under the table” earnings can occur in the low-
income population (Edin and Lein 1997; Venkatesh 2006), and these earnings do not show up on 
tax data.  Likewise, ASEC sample members will not be matched to the DER if (a) they did not 
give consent to be linked to the DER, (b) they had no earnings covered by the DER (legal or 
illegal), or (c) they did not work for pay.  The former (difference between ASEC and DER 
reports) implies that we need to make an adjustment for measurement differences across the two 
series, while the latter (not matched to the DER) implies we need to make an adjustment for 
sample composition differences across the series. 
Formally, we expand our decomposition of the poverty rate in equation (1) from two 
groups to four groups defined by respondent/nonrespondent status and DER match/nonmatch 
status as 
 Match DER Nonmatch DER 
Respondent 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗  Pr {𝑅&𝑀} 𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗  Pr {𝑅&𝑁𝑀} 
Nonrespondent 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑀} 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗  Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑁𝑀} 
 
where the subscript M refers to an ASEC sample member matched to the DER and NM is not 
matched to the DER. For example, in the top left cell, 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  is the poverty rate of respondents 
matched to the DER using ASEC earnings, and Pr{R&M} is the probability of responding to the 
ASEC and matched to the DER.  This permits us to rewrite equation (1) as 
(4)  𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅&𝑀} + 𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑅&𝑁𝑀} + 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅&𝑀} + 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗
Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑁𝑀}. 
We observe 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  and 𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  in the ASEC regardless of match status, and hereafter we collapse 
the first two terms in equation (4) as 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑅} , which is simply the first term in equation 
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(1).  However, we do not observe 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  or 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 , and thus use the DER earnings to provide an 
alternative measure of the earnings for these two unobservable poverty rates.  
In equation (4), we replace 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  with 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 , which is the poverty rate of matched 
nonrespondents using the DER as the measure of earnings.  To account for measurement 
differences between the DER and the ASEC, we add a correction for measurement error among 
matched respondents: (𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅).  Putting this together gives an estimator for the term 
𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶   
(5)  𝑃�𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 + (𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅). 
We would like to make a similar substitution for 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  with 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅  in the final term of 
equation (4), but we cannot measure the poverty rate of nonmatched nonrespondents using DER 
earnings, i.e 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅  will never be observed. If we assume that nonmatched nonrespondents are 
similar to matched nonrespondents, we could use the estimator in equation (5) 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 + (𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 −
𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅).  However, the population who are not matched to the DER differs from those who are 
matched to the DER in both demographic characteristics and in earnings levels.  To correct for 
these differences we compare the ASEC earnings of nonmatched respondents to matched 
respondents (𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶).  Substituting these expressions into the term for  𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  gives our 
estimator 
(6)  𝑃�𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 + �𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅� +  (𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶). 
Our approach here allows for nonresponse to be related not only to demographic 
characteristics (as does the hot deck procedure), but also related to unobservable characteristics 
and the income level or poverty rate itself.  The relationship to demographic characteristics is 
strengthened when we construct the poverty rate by weighted demographic subgroups below. 
Our approach also allows matching or failure to match to be related to demographic 
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characteristics as well as unobservable characteristics.  As such it also allows the DER and 
ASEC measures to differ and corrects for those differences.  However, we assume that there is 
no interaction between these three mechanisms. That is, we are assuming that conditional on 
poverty status, measurement differences, nonresponse, and nonmatch are independent.  In 
equation (5) the term (𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅) implies we are assuming that measurement differences 
between the DER and the ASEC do not differ between respondents and nonrespondents.  That is, 
if nonrespondents were to respond, the differences between their DER record and their ASEC 
response would be similar to the differences between current respondents DER and ASEC.  In 
equation (6) the term (𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶) implies we are assuming that the differences in poverty 
rates between the matched and nonmatched populations are the same in both the DER and the 
ASEC. The first set of assumptions, which allow equation (5) to provide an estimate of the term 
𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  are weaker than the missing at random assumption used in the hot deck procedure.  
Indeed, if the missing at random assumption holds, the results in equation (5) should be 
equivalent (up to sampling error) with using the hot deck procedure.  The second set of 
assumptions regarding the match are not required for the hot deck procedure since the hot deck 
does not involve matching to the DER.  However, if missing at random holds, and nonmatched at 
random were also to hold, then again our procedure should be similar to the hot deck.  Our 
procedure allows both of these assumptions to fail, but requires nonmatch, nonresponse, and 
measurement error processes to be independent of each other, conditional on poverty status.  
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) gives our benchmark expression for the full response poverty 
rate, 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 , as 
(7) 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅} + �𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 + �𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅�� ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅&𝑀} + �𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅 +
�𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅� + (𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶)� ∗ Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑁𝑀}. 
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It is worth emphasizing that the expression in (7) consists solely of observed data—both survey 
and administrative—and thus serves as our estimate of the “true” poverty rate in the U.S. 
 Against the benchmark in (7) we compare simpler alternatives utilizing the DER, what 
we call “plug-in” estimates of poverty.  For example, we can replace ASEC earnings with DER 
earnings for all persons with a DER match regardless of imputation status and use ASEC (hot 
deck) earnings for persons without a DER match: 
(8)   𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 = 𝑷𝑹,𝑴𝑫𝑬𝑹 ∗ Pr{𝑅&𝑀} + 𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑅&𝑁𝑀} + 𝑷𝑵𝑹,𝑴𝑫𝑬𝑹 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅&𝑀} +
𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑁𝑀}, 
where the DER-based earnings poverty rates are highlighted in bold.  This approach implicitly 
assumes that survey reports in the ASEC are mismeasured and the DER records provide a 
superior measure of earnings.  This may not be true, however, both because some earnings 
reported in CPS are not taxable, and some earnings may be reported to the Census but not to the 
IRS, especially self-employment earnings and “under the table” earnings (Bound and Krueger 
1991; Bollinger 1998; Roemer 2002).  
In a related approach we replace ASEC earnings with DER earnings only for those 
nonrespondents with a DER match, and use reported ASEC earnings for respondents and (hot 
deck) ASEC earnings for persons without a DER match:   
(9)   𝑃𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 = 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr{𝑅&𝑀} + 𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑅&𝑁𝑀} + 𝑷𝑵𝑹,𝑴𝑫𝑬𝑹 ∗ Pr{𝑁𝑅&𝑀} +
𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑁𝑅&𝑁𝑀}. 
The logic here is that DER earnings for the actual worker dominate imputed earnings from an 
unrelated person, especially if the missing at random assumption is violated (either because the 
imputation algorithm uses too sparse a set of demographics, or there is selection on 
unobservables). 
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 The approaches in equations (8) and (9) are closely related to Turek, et al. (2012) and 
Nicholas and Wiseman (2009, 2010).  Turek, et al. merge earnings information from the DER to 
the 2006 ASEC (calendar year 2005) to examine the effect of substituting DER earnings for 
reported ASEC earnings on income estimates and number of persons in poverty.  They focus 
only on workers, and those with a DER match, and thus do not examine the entire poverty 
universe as we do here.  Nicholas and Wiseman (2009, 2010) merge both DER and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) administrative data to the ASEC to study poverty among 
elderly persons in the U.S. (and also present a subset of estimates for the whole population).  
Their approach is a variant of equation (8) where they use the maximum of the ASEC and DER 
for the measure of earnings and employ a reweighting adjustment for ASEC observations 
unmatched to the administrative data.  This method makes the strong assumption that 
measurement error in the ASEC is always negative (not simply an underreport of true earnings 
on average, but never an overreport).  This is particularly strong when considering the 
nonrespondents.  In these cases the DER is used only when it exceeds the hot deck imputation.  
Since the hot deck is a random match, we expect it to contain differences that are both positive 
and negative.  It also makes the somewhat weaker assumption that earnings in the DER are 
always an understatement of true earnings.  Since the procedure also uses the hot deck earnings 
for individuals who are not matched to the DER, this assumes that nonmatched, nonrespondents 
are missing and unmatched at random.  This approach, by construction, will necessarily result in 
a lower poverty rate than that achieved by the hot deck procedure.  There is little justification for 
a procedure designed this way.  Finally, this series will differ from the historical ASEC series, 
since it is considering an income definition that differs from both the survey and DER measures. 
While in some ways this may be an improved measure of poverty, our approach seeks to provide 
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a series that would be comparable to the measures in historical ASEC poverty rates (when 
nonresponse was negligible) and to other data series with smaller nonresponse rates.  However, 
for completeness we will present a third plug-in poverty estimate, 𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛, based on the 
maximum ASEC/DER report. 
III. Measuring Poverty in the Presence of Nonresponse without Administrative Data 
 The linked ASEC-DER data are not available in the public domain since they consist of 
proprietary tax information, and thus the research community at large cannot construct the full-
response poverty rate in equation (7).  Indeed, the linked data are only available with a lag, and 
thus if utilized by the Census Bureau could result in costly delays in releasing official poverty 
statistics.  This then begs the question:  what do you do in the absence of administrative data to 
handle nonresponse?  If we assume that earnings are missing completely at random (MCAR), 
then the best strategy is to simply drop nonrespondents altogether and report 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶  as the 
official poverty rate. Like Manski bounds, this too may be extreme because of evidence that 
nonresponse is correlated with several observable characteristics such as education, gender, and 
race (Bollinger and Hirsch 2006, 2013).  The primary characteristic in which they differ is that 
all nonrespondents are earners.  Since, on average, earners are less likely to be in poverty than 
households with no one in the labor force, the sample is then no longer representative, and 
indeed is biased toward a higher poverty population than the population as a whole. We have 
substantial demographic information on nonrespondents in the ASEC.  Indeed, even in the case 
of whole supplement nonrespondents, we have some information on the basic demographic 
profile of the household.  Thus a more robust approach is to assume the data are missing at 
random, and below we assess several alternatives to the full response poverty rate in (7). 
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A. The ASEC Hot Deck Imputation Procedure 
The Census Bureau makes the missing at random (MAR) assumption to utilize a set of 
demographic variables to match nonrespondents to respondents, and thus to replace the missing 
earnings of the nonrespondent with the earnings of the matched respondent to implicitly 
construct an estimate of 𝑃𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 .  Specifically, Census has used a hot deck procedure for imputing 
missing income since 1962, and the current system has been in place with few changes since 
1989 (Welniak 1990).  The cell hot deck procedure assigns individuals with missing earnings 
values that come from individuals with similar characteristics.  The ASEC uses a variation of the 
cell hot deck procedure known as a sequential match procedure.  First, individuals with missing 
data are divided into one of 12 allocation groups defined by the pattern of nonresponse.  
Examples include a group that is only missing earnings from longest job or a group that is 
missing both longest job information and earnings from longest job.  Second, an observation in 
each allocation group is matched to another observation with complete data (called the donor) 
based on a large set of socioeconomic variables, the match variables.8 If no match is found based 
on the full set of match variables, then a match variable is dropped and variable definitions are 
collapsed to be less restrictive.  The process of sequentially dropping variables and collapsing 
variable definitions is repeated until a match is found. When a match is successful, the missing 
earnings is substituted with the reported earnings from the first available donor.   
The ASEC also uses a hot deck procedure for whole supplement, or unit, nonresponse.  In 
this context, whole imputation refers to an individual who responds to the monthly basic earner 
study but does not respond to the ASEC supplement and requires the entire supplement to be 
imputed.  Instead of 12 allocation groups, the whole imputation procedure uses 8 allocation 
                                                 
8 The set of match variables includes gender, race, age, relationship to householder, years of school completed, 
marital status, presence of children, labor force status of spouse, weeks worked, hours worked, occupation, class of 
worker, other earnings receipt, type of residence, region, transfer payments receipt, and person status. 
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groups. Moreover, the set of match variables is smaller than the set used for item nonresponse, 
consisting solely of variables from the basic monthly CPS.  To be considered a donor for whole 
imputations, an ASEC respondent has to meet the minimum requirement that at least one person 
in the household has answered one of the following questions: worked at a job or business in the 
last year; received federal or state unemployment compensation in the last year; received 
supplemental unemployment benefit in the last year; received union unemployment or strike 
benefit in the last year; or lived in the same house one year ago. This requirement implies that 
whole supplement donors do not have to answer all the ASEC questions and can have item 
imputations.  Similar to the sequential hot deck procedure for item nonresponse, the match 
process sequentially drops variables and makes them less restrictive until a donor is found. 
B. Inverse Probability Weighting 
 A potential pitfall of the Census hot deck procedure is the finite set of covariates that are 
used to find a matched donor.  An alternative approach for nonresponse under the MAR 
assumption is inverse probability weighting (IPW) (Wooldridge 2007, 2010).  IPW is likely to be 
more general than the hot deck procedure as it offers a solution to the “curse of dimensionality,” 
which arises from the computational burden with hot deck from expanding the set of covariates 
used to match.  As such, IPW is closely related to the propensity score method in the treatment 
effects literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  IPW, like the hot deck procedure, assumes 
missing at random.  It further assumes that a set of demographic factors, 𝒛𝒊, are observed that 
predict whether the individual responds or not to the earnings questions, and that the resulting 
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prediction of response probability is everywhere nonzero.9  With these assumptions we can 
obtain a consistent estimate of the population poverty rate (Wooldridge 2010, p. 822-823) 
(10) 𝑃 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑖/Pr {𝒛𝒊}𝑛𝑖=1 )/∑ (𝑅𝑖/Pr {𝒛𝒊})𝑛𝑖=1 , 
which is the poverty rate of respondents weighted by the inverse probability of response.  To 
implement the IPW approach we need to fit a flexible model of the probability of response, 
Pr {𝑅}, which can include higher-order powers and interactions of the 𝒛𝒊. The computational 
advantage of IPW over the hot deck then becomes clear because it is not necessary to find a 
donor that matches across a wide array of characteristics, but only a single index of the 
probability of response. 
In practice, the Census Bureau weights the ASEC sample poverty rate by the inverse 
probability of sample inclusion adjusted for survey nonparticipation and other special factors in 
order to be representative of the U.S. population.10  Thus, the current official poverty rate is an 
IPW estimator; that is, 𝑃𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 /∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑖 is the (adjusted) inverse probability 
of sample inclusion for the individual and ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  is an estimate of the U.S. population.  This 
means that if we wish to retain population representativeness utilizing the ASEC for respondents 
only, then we need to adjust the Census measure for earnings nonresponse as 
(11) 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑊 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑖/Pr {𝒛𝒊}𝑛𝑖=1 )/∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑤𝑖/Pr {𝒛𝒊})𝑛𝑖=1 , 
which weights up the respondent sample so that the population estimate is retained.  For 
example, if 𝑤1 = 10,000 (i.e. the probability of person 1 being sampled is 0.001 so that they 
represent 10,000 people), and the probability of person 1 being a respondent is Pr {𝒛𝟏} =0.4, then 
                                                 
9 Strictly, for persons out of the labor force such as retirees we can identify their poverty status even if they are an 
earnings nonrespondent.  Thus in implementing the various poverty estimators we will differentiate between 
working and non-working individuals. 
10 See Current Population Survey, Design and Methodology, Technical Paper 66, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/tp-66.pdf (accessed October 30, 2013) for details. 
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the new weight for person 1, 𝑤1/Pr {𝑧1}, is 25,000.  Below we compare both the official poverty 
rate and the IPW variant based on respondents only to our benchmark measure. 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 summarizes the differences in assumptions between the various approaches 
examined in this paper.  The Manski bounds have the weakest set of assumptions, but necessarily 
yield the weakest conclusions.  Manski bounds are useful in assessing the uncertainty inherent 
with the problem of missing data, and also in evaluating estimators with differing assumptions.   
In this research we are using the CPS measures of income as “correct” not because we strongly 
believe they are superior, but rather because they represent a common (over time and across 
surveys) measure.  Hence, we argue that any approach which rejects this assumption does not 
meet the spirit of the endeavor (specifically the all DER measures and the Max measure).  Our 
approach, 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙, is one of the three approaches which only use two assumptions (one being that 
the CPS is correct). The official hot deck approach, 𝑃𝐶 , and inverse probability weighting, 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑊, 
both only assume missing at random and that the CPS is correct.  If missing at random holds, our 
approach will also work provided our independence assumption holds as well.  However, our 
results below, the work of Bollinger and Hirsch (2013), and recent work by Hokayem et al 
(2013) provide evidence that missing at random does not hold.  Hence the IPW and hot deck are 
likely to be biased, and our approach uses the weakest assumptions besides the Manski bounds. 
IV.  Data 
Our sample consists of the entire Census poverty universe; that is, all noninstitutionalized 
families and unrelated individuals ages 15 and older from the ASEC for survey years 1998-2009 
(reporting income for 1997-2008).  The ASEC is then matched to the Social Security 
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Administration’s Detailed Earnings Record (DER) file.11  The DER file is an extract of Social 
Security Administration’s Master Earning File (MEF) and includes data on total earnings, 
including wages and salaries and income from self-employment subject to Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) and/or Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxation.  Since 
individuals do not make SECA contributions if they lose money in self-employment, only 
positive self-employment earnings are reported in the DER file (Nicholas and Wiseman 2009).  
Nonworkers and those who do not pay into Social Security are not in the DER.   
Workers in the DER file are uniquely identified by a Protected Identification Key (PIK) 
assigned by the Census Bureau, which is a confidentiality-protected version of the Social 
Security Number (SSN). The Center for Administrative Records Research and Applications 
(CARRA) within Census matches the DER file to the ASEC.  Since the CPS does not currently 
ask respondents for a SSN, CARRA uses its own record linkage software system, the Person 
Validation System, to assign a SSN.12  This assignment relies on a probabilistic matching model 
based on name, address, date of birth, and gender (NORC 2011).  The SSN is then converted to a 
PIK, and the SSN from the DER file received from SSA is also converted to a PIK.  The ASEC 
and DER files are matched based on the PIK and do not contain the SSN. 
The DER file contains earnings reported on a worker’s W-2 form, and there is one record 
for each W-2 for those workers holding multiple jobs.  Figure 3 provides a sample W-2 form 
with the circled boxes we use in the analysis.  These earnings are not capped at the FICA 
contribution amounts and include earnings not covered by Old Age Survivor’s Disability 
                                                 
11 The DER were not linked to the 2001 SCHIP expansion sample in 2001, but were in each year thereafter.  For 
more information on sampling and non-sampling error in the ASEC, see 
http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf (accessed October 30, 2013). 
12 The final year the CPS collected respondent Social Security Number is CPS survey year 2005 (calendar year 
2004).  Beginning with survey year 2006 (calendar year 2005), all respondents were assigned a Social Security 
Number using the Person Validation System, whereas in prior years a SSN was assigned only if the SSN was not 
valid.  
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Insurance (OASDI) but subject to Medicare tax.  Unlike ASEC earnings which are top-coded by 
Census, DER earnings are not top-coded.  The DER file also contains deferred wages such as 
contributions to 401(k), 403(b), 408(k), 457(b), 501(c), and HSA plans, but not pre-tax health 
insurance premiums and education benefits and thus is not a complete source of gross 
compensation (Abowd and Stinson 2013).  Since a worker can appear multiple times per year in 
the DER file if they have several jobs, we collapse the DER file into one earnings observation 
per worker per year by aggregating total compensation (Box 1 of W-2), SSA covered self-
employment earnings (SEI-FICA), and Medicare covered self-employment earnings (SEI-
MEDICARE) across all employers.  DER earnings are defined as the sum of total compensation 
plus the maximum of SSA covered self-employment income or Medicare covered self-
employment:  
 DER Earnings = (Box 1 of W-2) + max(SEI-FICA,SEI-MEDICARE). 
 
In this way DER earnings is most compatible with the CPS earnings (PEARNVAL), which cover 
earnings from all wage and salary jobs (WSAL-VAL), business self-employment (SEMP-VAL), 
and farm self-employment (FRSE-VAL).  The CPS total personal income variable (PTOTVAL) 
used to determine poverty status consists of adding a person’s total earnings to a person’s total 
other income (POTHVAL), PTOTVAL=PEARNVAL+POTHVAL. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Like the match to the DER, imputations of earnings occur at the individual level as well.  
For our purposes we classify a worker as having imputed earnings if either wages and salary 
from longest job is imputed (I-ERNVAL), wages and salary from other jobs is imputed (I-
WSVAL), self-employment earnings is imputed (I-SEVAL and I-FRMVAL), or the whole 
ASEC supplement is imputed (FL-665).  However, since the official poverty rate in the U.S. is a 
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family concept, Census sums individual income across all persons in the family to create family 
income that is compared to the official poverty threshold.  Thus, to be consistent with the family 
definition of poverty, we aggregate individual income nonresponse and match status to create 
family level variables.  That is, a family is considered imputed if any member in the family has 
imputed earnings, or has the entire supplement imputed.  A family is considered matched to the 
DER data if all earners in the family are matched to a DER record.  An implication is that it is 
possible for families to contain no workers, especially among retirees and the disabled, and thus 
by construction no match with the DER is possible for the family.  Consequently we have to 
modify our full poverty rate in equation (7) to be conditional on earner status in the family, i.e 
(12)   𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 = (𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙|𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 ≥ 1) Pr{𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 ≥ 1} + (𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙|𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 0) Pr{𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 0}. 
These new definitions of family imputation and family match differ from previous 
research (e.g. Nicholas and Wiseman 2009, 2010; Turek, et al. 2012) that defined these concepts 
at the individual level, which is incongruent with the family-level construct of Census poverty.   
We note, however, that the level and trend in earnings nonresponse (item and whole supplement) 
is qualitatively little affected by aggregating up to the family level compared to the individual 
level in Figure 1, rising from 26.4 percent in 1997 to 29.4 percent in 2008.13  Figure 4 depicts 
trends in the family level ASEC-DER match rate conditional on earners in the family (recall that 
by construction a family cannot be matched if there are no earners).  In 1997 just over 60 percent 
of earner families in the ASEC were matched to the DER, and this rose to 74 percent starting in 
2005 and held steady thereafter.14  The shift up in matches most likely occurred because Census 
changed the consent process for linking to SSA data from “opt-in” to “opt-out,” i.e. starting in 
2005 sample members were automatically enrolled in the link process and had to request that 
                                                 
13 The nonresponse rate in 1997 is statistically different from the nonresponse rate in 2008. 
14 The match rate in 1997 is statistically different from the match rate in 2005. 
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they be removed. Importantly there is a 20-25 percentage point difference in DER match rates 
depending on whether the family is a respondent or nonrespondent, highlighting the importance 
of distinguishing match/nonmatch by respondent status in our full-response poverty rate in 
equation (7).15 
[Figure 4 here] 
V.  Results 
Table 2 presents detailed summary statistics of the sample family head based on match 
and respondent status.  Across most demographic characteristics the differences between 
matched and nonmatched families is much more pronounced among respondents than 
nonrespondents.  For example, matched respondents are 14 years younger on average than 
nonmatched respondents, reflecting the fact that the latter group is much more likely to be retired 
or disabled, while there is only a 3 year age gap between matched and nonmatched 
nonrespondents.  In both cases, the differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Likewise matched respondents are statistically much less likely to be a high school dropout or to 
be living in poverty than nonmatched respondents.  These gaps are relatively small among 
nonrespondents.  As a consequence, ASEC earnings and family income are substantially and 
statistically higher for matched than nonmatched respondents.  Interestingly, though, is that even 
though the difference in earnings and income among nonrepondents is comparatively small 
across match status, the level is higher than among respondents, suggesting that high income 
persons are less likely to respond to the ASEC.16  
                                                 
15  The match rate for respondent families is statistically different from the match rate for nonrespondent families in 
all years.  We note that the family level DER match rate of earners is about 10-12 percentage points lower than 
individual level match rates.  This occurs because about 10 percent of families have more earners than DER 
matches, and thus we classify the whole family as nonmatched. 
16 ASEC and DER family earnings and income for matched respondents is statistically different from ASEC and 
DER family earnings and income for matched nonrespondents. ASEC family earnings and income for nonmatched 
respondents is statistically different from ASEC family earnings and income for nonmatched nonrespondents. 
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[Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents our benchmark full-response poverty estimates from equations (7) and 
(12), and compares it to the other poverty rates based on the administrative DER data: the two 
“plug-in” poverty rates using the DER, and the third that uses the maximum earnings between 
the ASEC and DER for matched nonrespondents. The full response poverty rate ranges from a 
low of 11.9 percent in 2000 to 14.2 percent in 2008, and these differences are statistically 
significant.  The plug-in poverty rate using the DER for both respondents and nonrespondents 
from equation (8) is higher than the benchmark rate in all but one of the years where they are 
statistically different.  Just the opposite occurs with the plug-in rate using DER for 
nonrespondents only in equation (9), where the series is statistically much lower in each year.  
This is even more pronounced when using the maximum of the ASEC and DER earnings, which 
was expected because this method makes the strong assumption that measurement error in the 
ASEC is always negative and thus will result in a poverty rate lower than the full response rate 
(and the official rate).  Taken together, these results suggest that the missing at random 
assumption does not appear to hold: nonrespondents are more likely to be in poverty than their 
matched counterparts. 
[Table 3 here] 
In Tables 4a and 4b we explore in finer detail the components of the full response poverty 
rate that might shed light on why the official poverty rate is systematically lower.  In Table 4a 
we present the components of equation (7) for families with at least one earner (recall equation 
(12) where the full response poverty rate is the weighted sum of the rates of earner and nonearner 
families).  The numbers in bold in columns (1), (4), and (6) sum up to the number in column (7) 
subject to rounding error.  Of particular note is column (3) where we compare the poverty rates 
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of matched respondents using ASEC earnings versus DER earnings.  The difference is negative, 
which means that ASEC earnings are higher and poverty rates lower than in the DER, suggesting 
that ASEC earnings captures income sources not reported to the DER either because they are not 
taxable or they are “under the table.”17  On the other hand, in column (5) we report the difference 
in poverty rates of nonmatched respondents and matched respondents in the ASEC.  This 
difference is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that nonmatched respondent 
families are systematically poorer than matched families. This correction grows over time, 
especially after 2004 when the Census changed from the “opt-in” to the “opt-out” consent of 
being linked.  In Table 4b we present the same calculations for nonearner families. Note that 
most of the terms are zero since by construction nonearner families are not matched to the DER. 
Also notable is the fact that the poverty rates of nonearner families are more than three times 
higher that earner families.18  The full poverty rate reported in Table 3 is much closer to the 
earner rates because the probability of a family containing at least one worker averages over 85 
percent in each year so that the earner sample receives nearly 6 times more weight in the full 
poverty calculation.   
[Tables 4a-4b here] 
In Table 5 we compare the benchmark full poverty rate to poverty rates based solely on 
publicly available ASEC data, including the poverty rate of ASEC respondents only under the 
missing completely at random assumption (𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶), the official poverty rate under missing at 
random (𝑃𝐶), and the IPW poverty rate also derived under missing at random (𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑊).  The 
poverty rate from respondents only is systematically too high by 0.4 percentage points on 
average, suggesting that the missing completely at random assumption is incorrect for missing 
                                                 
17 The poverty rate of matched respondents using ASEC earnings is statistically different from the poverty rate of 
matched respondents using DER earnings in all years. 
18 The poverty rate of nonearner families is statistically different from the poverty rate of earner families in all years. 
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earnings reports.19  On the other hand, the official poverty rate is statistically significantly lower 
in each year, averaging about 1.0 percentage point lower than the full-response benchmark, and 
this gap seems to have widened over time.  This suggests that the official rate is undercounting 
poverty compared to a rate in which all sample members respond to the earnings questions.   
[Table 5 here] 
For the IPW poverty rate, we examined combinations of three different sets of 
demographic characteristics and three different models for the probability of nonresponse. The 
demographic characteristics include age (represented by a quartic function), race, gender, 
education (represented by degree and attendance indicator variables), marital status, class of 
worker (private, federal, state or local), foreign born citizenship status, and occupation.  At the 
family level we also measure the size of metropolitan area, the region of the country, and the 
respondent’s relationship to the head of the household.  We measure the individual demographic 
characteristics for the head of the family, the spouse of the head (suppressing the spouse’s 
marital status), and the respondent for the household.  We estimate models using head’s 
characteristics only, head and spouse, head and respondent, and all three sets always in 
conjunction with the household level characteristics. We used a linear probability model 
estimated using OLS, as well as probit and logit specifications estimated using maximum 
likelihood. We find virtually no qualitative differences between the final estimated IPW poverty 
rates across these specifications, and in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b we report the coefficients 
from the probit specification.  We further experimented with dropping the respondent’s 
relationship to the head of the household in models including only the head of the household 
characteristics.  We find that the resulting estimated poverty rates do not differ either statistically 
or qualitatively across any of these specification choices.  Since the respondent is not identified 
                                                 
19 The poverty rate from respondents only is statistically different from the full poverty rate in all years but 2007. 
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in public use data in years prior to 1999, we settle on a probit model using only the 
characteristics of the head of the household and the household variables excluding the 
relationship of the respondent to the head.  The models are estimated year by year. 
With the estimated parameters we reweight the poverty rate of respondents in equation 
(11) and find that the IPW poverty rate is statistically and qualitatively systematically lower than 
the benchmark by about 0.5 percentage point.  We note that if we take the simple average of the 
respondent-only poverty rate and the IPW poverty rate based on measured earnings in the ASEC 
(last two columns of Table 5) we derive a poverty series that is not statistically different from the 
full response poverty rate in the majority of years, and when they do differ they are sometimes 
higher and sometimes lower.20  The advantage of the average of the respondent poverty rate and 
the IPW rate is that they are obtained from public release ASEC data and do not require the 
proprietary DER.  However, understanding the differences between the respondent-only poverty 
rate and the IPW poverty rate obtained from the public release ASEC data is challenging.   
[Figure 5 here] 
To better understand why the respondent-only poverty rate is higher, Figure 5 presents 
the nonresponse rate by DER earnings percentile for persons ages 18-64, not enrolled in school 
full-time, and not in the Armed Forces.  This sample includes workers and nonworkers.  It shows 
nonresponse is relatively flat throughout most of the distribution with a spike at the top.  
Approximately 85 to 87 percent of the sample consists of “earner” families.  Nonearner families 
have a higher poverty rate (32.3 to 37 percent) than families with at least one earner (8.8 to 9.4 
percent) (last columns of Tables 4a and 4b).  Nonearner families, by definition, have a zero 
nonresponse rate.  A typical nonrespondent family has a much lower probability of being in 
                                                 
20 The average of the respondent poverty rate and the IPW poverty rate is statistically different from the full 
response poverty rate only in 2001, 2003, and 2007. 
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poverty than a typical earner family.  The respondent-only poverty rate that “drops all 
nonrespondents” disproportionately drops families that are less likely to be in poverty and is 
exacerbated by dropping families at the top end of the distribution.  This causes the approach of 
“dropping all nonrespondents” to overstate the poverty rate because the sample is biased away 
from families with workers. 
[Figure 6 here] 
While the respondent-only approach overstates the poverty rate, the IPW approach 
understates the poverty rate.  Figure 6 helps understand why the IPW approach has this effect.  
To obtain this figure we estimate a log DER wage equation by gender using the covariates in the 
inverse probability weighting models and in the hot deck procedure. Note this wage equation 
uses DER earnings rather than CPS earnings, and is for workers only. Figure 6 plots the 
nonresponse rate across the residual distribution from the wage equation by gender.  It shows a 
pronounced U-shape, with high nonresponse in both tails of the residual distribution.  Even after 
conditioning on the covariates typically used in the hot deck procedure and in the IPW approach, 
we still see a double selection found in the extreme tails of the residual distribution.  This 
suggests a violation of the missing at random assumption necessary for both the hot deck 
procedure and the IPW approach.  This also suggests there are unobservables causing 
nonresponse among individuals with low earnings than what observables would predict.  The hot 
deck procedure and the weighting adjustments in the IPW approach do not account for these 
unobservables.  
 [Tables 6 and 7 here] 
 We conclude our empirical analysis by presenting the full response and official poverty 
rates for a variety of demographic groups to examine whether there are particular subsamples 
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driving the results.  Table 6 shows that on average families with children have full poverty rates 
1.4 percentage points higher than the official rate, families headed by a female have full rates 1 
percentage point higher, and families headed by a nonwhite or nonblack (other race) have full 
rates 1.5 percentage points higher on average.21  It does appear that some groups have a larger 
effect on the full poverty series than others.  To further examine if this heterogeneity is 
suppressed in our full poverty rate of equations (7) and (10), we compute a demographically 
weighted full poverty rate as 𝑃𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑃𝑗
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙, where 𝑠𝑗 is the population share of group j 
and 𝑃𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 is the subgroup j full response poverty rate.  We use 18 groups formed by the partition 
of race (black, white, other race), headship (female, male), and education (less than high school, 
high school, and more than high school).  This approach allows the correction to differ across 
groups with known differences in response rates.  We report this approach in Table 7 where we 
see that there is no substantive or statistical difference in the full poverty rate and 
demographically weighted rate in most years.22  
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper uses a unique dataset of administrative earnings data matched to internal 
ASEC to study the effects of earnings imputation on poverty measurement.  Our analysis 
estimates the bias caused by earnings nonresponse.  We compare a “full response” poverty rate 
that assumes all ASEC respondents provided earnings data to the official poverty rate to gauge 
this bias. On average, we find the nonresponse bias to be about 1.0 percentage point.  This bias 
                                                 
21 The difference between the full poverty rate and the official poverty rate for children is statistically significant in 
all years but 2000.  The difference between the full poverty rate and the official poverty rate for families headed by a 
female is statistically different in all years but 1997 and 2000.  The difference between the full poverty rate and the 
official poverty rate for families headed by a nonwhite or nonblack (other race) is statistically significant in all years 
but 1997 and 1998. 
22 The only years where there is a statistical difference between the full poverty rate and the demographically 
weighted poverty rate are 2002, 2003, and 2007. 
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seems more pronounced among more economically disadvantaged groups such as single female-
headed families and those families headed by a nonwhite. 
Our study is somewhat unique in that we take the stance that earnings reported in the 
ASEC are “ideal” compared to administrative reports in the DER.  This stems from the fact that 
not all earnings are subject to Social Security taxation and thus not reported in the DER, and 
“under the table” earnings may show up in the ASEC but are not reported to tax authorities.  This 
seems borne out in our sample in that poverty rates across the 12 years among matched 
respondents averages a statistically significant 1.7 percentage points lower using ASEC earnings 
than DER earnings.  This suggests that simply replacing ASEC earnings with DER earnings is 
not the best solution to earnings nonresponse.   
However, even though ASEC earnings may be preferred to DER earnings, simply 
dropping nonrespondents is not ideal either.  Our estimates suggest that dropping nonrespondents 
results in a poverty rate systematically higher than our preferred full-response poverty rate.  The 
bias caused by dropping nonrespondents likely stems from the loss of high earners who overall 
are more likely to be nonrespondents (see Bollinger and Hirsch, 2013).   Moreover, Little and 
Rubin (2002) make a compelling case against such practice because of the potential loss of 
efficiency and representativeness.  To address the latter concern, we constructed an inverse 
probability weighted poverty series and found that this series results in too low of a poverty rate 
relative to our benchmark (typically in the middle of the range between the official poverty rate 
and the full-response rate). On the other hand, a non-structural simple average of the poverty 
rates from dropping nonrespondents and the inverse probability weighted series is qualitatively 
and statistically no different than our full response series in most years.  Thus, while we argue 
that our preferred measure of poverty is the full response measure, it is not possible for 
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researchers and analysts to construct it without access to the DER, so the simple average may be 
a fruitful alternative since it relies solely on publicly available data in the ASEC.  The weighted 
average is a compromise, but is more serendipitous than structural.  As such, it should be 
corroborated in future samples and possibly in previous years.  Most importantly, however, the 
accuracy of official poverty estimates in the U.S. would benefit greatly from reduced 
nonresponse of earnings and other income sources.   
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Table 1:  Assumptions Required for Consistent Estimation of Poverty for Alternative Estimators 
Estimator Missing 
at 
Random 
Nonmatch 
at Random 
ASEC 
correct 
DER 
correct 
Max(ASEC
,DER) 
correct 
Independence of 
response/match/measureme
nt conditional on poverty 
status 
       
𝑃𝐶  
 
X  X    
𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 
 
  X   X 
𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 
 
X X  X  X 
𝑃𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 
 
 X X X  X 
𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 
 
X X   X X 
𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑊 
 
X  X    
𝑃𝐿𝐵,𝑃𝑈𝐵   X    
Note: ASEC refers to the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey; DER refers to the Social Security Detailed Earnings 
Record; 𝑃𝐶  is the official Census poverty measure based on the hot deck; 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙  is our full response poverty measure based on earnings in the DER and ASEC; 
𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 replaces ASEC earnings with DER earnings for all matched workers regardless of response status; 𝑃𝑁𝑅
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 replaces ASEC earnings with DER 
earnings only for matched nonrespondents; 𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑔−𝑖𝑛 uses the maximum of the ASEC and DER for matched respondents; 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑊 uses inverse probability weights 
to reweight the ASEC poverty rate of respondents; and 𝑃𝐿𝐵 ,𝑃𝑈𝐵  are the Manski lower and upper bounds on the poverty rate.  See the text for details. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Head of Family) 
  
Respondent, 
DER Match 
Respondent, 
DER Nonmatch 
Nonrespondent, 
DER Match 
Nonrespondent, 
DER Nonmatch 
Characteristic Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean  
Std. 
 Err. Mean  
Std. 
Err. Mean  
Std. 
Err. 
Age  43.07 0.03 57.11 0.05 45.57 0.06 48.64 0.06 
Gender                 
     Male (%) 55.70 0.12 49.13 0.12 55.17 0.22 54.99 0.18 
     Female (%) 44.30 0.12 50.87 0.12 44.83 0.22 45.01 0.18 
Race                 
     White (%) 84.83 0.08 83.21 0.09 80.52 0.17 79.81 0.15 
     Black (%) 10.65 0.07 12.61 0.08 14.42 0.15 14.43 0.13 
     Other race (%) 4.52 0.05 4.18 0.05 5.06 0.09 5.76 0.08 
Marital Status                 
     Married (%) 54.74 0.19 46.43 0.20 58.51 0.35 59.80 0.29 
     Widowed (%) 3.82 0.07 21.15 0.16 5.07 0.16 8.33 0.16 
     Separated or Divorced (%) 19.31 0.15 16.79 0.15 17.53 0.27 14.89 0.21 
     Single, Never-Married (%) 22.13 0.16 15.63 0.14 18.89 0.27 16.97 0.22 
Educational Attainment                 
     Less Than High School (%) 9.13 0.07 23.28 0.10 11.65 0.14 15.57 0.13 
     High School Completed (%) 28.00 0.10 32.18 0.11 31.46 0.20 32.67 0.17 
     More than high school (%) 62.87 0.11 44.54 0.12 56.89 0.21 51.77 0.18 
Employment Status                 
     Employed (%) 83.14 0.14 34.62 0.18 80.91 0.27 67.82 0.26 
     Unemployed (%) 3.78 0.07 2.65 0.06 3.22 0.12 2.68 0.09 
     Not in labor force                 
          Retired (%) 4.84 0.08 43.66 0.19 6.89 0.18 15.77 0.21 
          Disabled (%) 1.88 0.05 10.19 0.11 2.41 0.10 4.28 0.11 
          Other reason (%) 5.73 0.08 8.68 0.11 6.11 0.16 9.13 0.16 
Family Size 2.51 0.00 2.13 0.00 2.69 0.01 2.69 0.01 
Number of related children under 18 0.77 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.67 0.00 
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Official Poverty Status (%) 6.50 0.12 21.19 0.20 7.06 0.23 11.19 0.23 
Family Type                 
     Married Couple (%) 53.47 0.11 44.49 0.11 57.07 0.20 57.93 0.16 
     Female Householder,no husband present 
(%) 26.74 0.10 36.87 0.11 25.41 0.17 25.34 0.14 
     Male Householder, no wife present (%) 19.79 0.09 18.64 0.09 17.52 0.15 16.74 0.12 
ASEC Family Earnings ($) 58417 154 18164 128 62220 314 53614 271 
DER Family Earnings ($) 55978 321 N/A N/A 61974 1521 N/A N/A 
ASEC Family Income ($) 65504 162 39421 130 70124 328 63711 281 
DER Family Income ($) 63065 327 N/A N/A 69877 1527 N/A N/A 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using generalized function parameters.  Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau,  
Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see  
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Table 3: Poverty Estimates Using ASEC and DER Data (Percent) 
Year 𝑷𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍 Std. Error 𝑷𝑹,𝑵𝑹
𝑷𝒍𝒖𝒈−𝒊𝒏 Std. Error 𝑷𝑵𝑹
𝑷𝒍𝒖𝒈−𝒊𝒏 Std. Error 𝑷𝑴𝒂𝒙
𝑷𝒍𝒖𝒈−𝒊𝒏 Std. Error 
1997 14.0 (0.216) 14.1 (0.217) 13.5 (0.213)*** 12.8 (0.208)*** 
1998 13.7 (0.213) 13.5     (0.212)** 12.9 (0.208)*** 12.3 (0.203)*** 
1999 12.5 (0.203) 12.6 (0.204) 12.1 (0.200)*** 11.5 (0.196)*** 
2000 11.9 (0.198) 12.1     (0.199)** 11.6 (0.196)*** 11.0 (0.191)*** 
2001 12.5 (0.143) 12.9      (0.145)*** 12.2 (0.142)*** 11.6 (0.139)*** 
2002 13.3 (0.146) 13.3 (0.146) 12.6 (0.143)*** 12.0 (0.140)*** 
2003 13.3 (0.146) 13.5      (0.146)*** 12.8 (0.143)*** 12.3 (0.141)*** 
2004 13.8 (0.147) 13.8 (0.147) 13.2 (0.144)*** 12.7 (0.142)*** 
2005 13.4 (0.145) 14.1      (0.148)*** 13.2 (0.144)*** 12.5 (0.140)*** 
2006 13.3 (0.143) 13.7      (0.145)*** 13.0 (0.142)*** 12.2 (0.138)*** 
2007 13.9 (0.145) 14.0 (0.146) 13.2 (0.142)*** 12.5 (0.139)*** 
2008 14.2 (0.146) 14.5      (0.147)*** 13.7 (0.144)*** 12.9 (0.140)*** 
Notes: See the text and Table 1 for description of the poverty rates.  Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using generalized function parameters. 
Significance reflects statistical test for comparison to 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙   ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >.Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Table 4a: Components of Full Response Poverty Conditional on at Least One Earner (𝑷𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍|Earner>=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year 𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∗ Pr {𝑅} 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀
𝐷𝐸𝑅  
(𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶
− 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅) 
((2)+(3))* 
Pr{NR&M} 
(𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶
− 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶) 
((2)+(3)+(5))* 
Pr{NR&DM} (𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 |Earner>=1) 
1997 6.8 12.0 -1.4 1.2 2.9 2.3 10.4 
1998 6.4 11.6 -1.4 1.2 2.7 2.7 10.3 
1999 6.2 10.2 -1.4 1.0 2.9 2.4 9.5 
2000 5.2 10.0 -1.4 1.3 2.5 2.4 8.8 
2001 5.5 10.3 -1.8 1.3 3.1 2.3 9.1 
2002 5.5 11.2 -1.9 1.4 3.9 2.8 9.7 
2003 5.5 11.5 -2.1 1.2 1.6 2.6 9.3 
2004 5.5 12.9 -1.8 1.4 1.3 3.0 9.9 
2005 5.5 10.6 -2.0 1.7 7.2 2.1 9.4 
2006 5.6 10.1 -1.8 1.7 6.7 2.1 9.4 
2007 5.8 10.9 -1.8 1.8 8.0 2.5 10.0 
2008 6.2 10.2 -1.7 1.6 8.1 2.3 10.2 
Notes: See the text and Table 1 for description of the poverty rates.  Bold columns sum to (PFull|Earner>=1) subject to rounding error. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Table 4b: Components of Full Response Poverty Conditional on No Earners (𝑷𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍|Earner=0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year 
𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶
∗ Pr {𝑅} 𝑃𝑁𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅  (𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅) 
((2)+(3))* 
Pr{NR&M} (𝑃𝑅,𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅,𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶) 
((2)+(3)+(5))* 
Pr{NR&DM} 
(𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 |Earner=0
) 
1997 32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.8 3.6 35.8 
1998 30.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.6 3.8 34.6 
1999 29.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.3 3.1 32.3 
2000 29.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.3 3.1 32.3 
2001 30.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.9 3.8 33.9 
2002 31.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.1 3.8 35.1 
2003 32.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.2 4.1 36.2 
2004 32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.1 3.9 36.1 
2005 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.9 3.6 36.9 
2006 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.5 3.8 36.5 
2007 33.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 3.3 36.8 
2008 33.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 3.6 37.0 
Notes: See the text and Table 1 for description of the poverty rates.  Bold columns sum to (PFull|Earner=0) subject to rounding error. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Table 5: Poverty Estimates Using ASEC Data (Percent) 
Year 𝑷𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍 Std. Error 𝑷𝑹𝑨𝑺𝑬𝑪 Std. Error 𝑷𝑪 Std. Error 𝑷𝑰𝑷𝑾 Std. Error 
Average 
(𝑷𝑹𝑨𝑺𝑬𝑪,𝑷𝑰𝑷𝑾) Std. Error 
1997 14.0 (0.216) 14.2 (0.217)** 13.3 (0.211)*** 13.5 (0.222)*** 13.9 (0.333) 
1998 13.7 (0.213) 13.9 (0.214)** 12.7 (0.206)*** 13.2 (0.219)*** 13.6 (0.329) 
1999 12.5 (0.203) 13.0 (0.206)*** 11.9 (0.199)*** 12.3 (0.211)** 12.7 (0.316) 
2000 11.9 (0.198) 12.4 (0.201)*** 11.3 (0.193)*** 11.6 (0.206)*** 12.0 (0.309) 
2001 12.5 (0.143) 13.1 (0.146)*** 11.7 (0.139)*** 12.3 (0.150)*** 12.7 (0.225)* 
2002 13.3 (0.146) 13.6 (0.147)*** 12.1 (0.140)*** 12.7 (0.151)*** 13.2 (0.226) 
2003 13.3 (0.146) 14.0 (0.149)*** 12.5 (0.142)*** 13.0 (0.152)*** 13.5 (0.228)* 
2004 13.8 (0.147) 14.1 (0.148)*** 12.7 (0.142)*** 13.2 (0.152)*** 13.7 (0.228) 
2005 13.4 (0.145) 13.8 (0.146)*** 12.6 (0.141)*** 13.1 (0.151)*** 13.5 (0.225) 
2006 13.3 (0.143) 13.8 (0.146)*** 12.3 (0.139)*** 13.0 (0.149)*** 13.4 (0.224) 
2007 13.9 (0.145) 14.0 (0.146) 12.5 (0.139)*** 13.2 (0.150)*** 13.6 (0.224)*** 
2008 14.2 (0.146) 14.5 (0.147)*** 13.2 (0.142)*** 13.8 (0.151)*** 14.2 (0.227) 
Notes: See the text and Table 1 for description of the poverty rates.  Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using generalized function  
parameters. Significance reflects statistical test for comparison to 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 .  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Table 6: Full Response Poverty Rate and Official Poverty Rate for Select Demographic Groups 
Full-Response Poverty (𝑷𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍) 
Year Full Sample Children Adults Elderly Female Head Black White Other Race 
1997 14.0 21.1 11.7 10.6 31.9 26.6 11.9 15.9 
1998 13.7 20.5 11.5 10.8 31.2 27.8 11.2 15.1 
1999 12.5 18.2 10.9 9.8 28.2 24.0 10.4 15.6 
2000 11.9 17.0 10.2 10.1 25.8 21.1 10.2 14.6 
2001 12.5 17.7 11.0 10.2 27.4 23.3 10.8 13.4 
2002 13.3 18.4 11.7 10.8 27.9 24.6 11.4 14.4 
2003 13.3 18.6 11.8 10.2 28.4 24.9 11.3 16.0 
2004 13.8 19.3 12.3 9.9 28.6 26.6 11.6 15.4 
2005 13.4 18.9 11.9 10.3 30.0 26.6 11.3 14.5 
2006 13.3 19.0 11.9 9.6 29.1 24.7 11.4 15.3 
2007 13.9 20.1 12.2 9.9 29.4 27.0 11.8 13.5 
2008 14.2 20.2 12.7 9.8 29.4 25.4 12.2 15.4 
Official Poverty Rate (𝑷𝑪) 
Year Full Sample Children Adults Elderly Female Head Black White Other Race 
1997 13.3 19.9 10.9 10.5 31.5 26.5 11.0 16.1 
1998 12.7 18.9 10.5 10.5 29.7 26.1 10.5 14.5 
1999 11.9 17.1 10.1 9.7 27.5 23.6 9.8 14.5 
2000 11.3 16.2 9.5 10.2 25.7 22.1 9.5 13.7 
2001 11.7 16.3 10.1 10.1 26.5 22.7 9.9 12.8 
2002 12.1 16.7 10.6 10.4 26.6 24.0 10.3 12.2 
2003 12.5 17.6 10.8 10.2 27.5 24.3 10.6 13.5 
2004 12.7 17.8 11.3 9.8 27.8 24.7 10.9 12.0 
2005 12.6 17.6 11.1 10.1 28.7 24.8 10.7 13.0 
2006 12.3 17.4 10.8 9.4 27.7 24.2 10.4 12.8 
2007 12.5 18.0 10.9 9.7 27.7 24.5 10.6 12.1 
2008 13.2 19.0 11.7 9.7 28.4 24.6 11.4 14.3 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic  
Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >.  
Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008.
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Table 7: Population Weighted Demographic Full Response Poverty Rate 
Year 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 Std. Error 
Population Weighted 
Demographic 𝑃𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 Std. Error 
1997 14.0 (0.216) 13.9 (0.215) 
1998 13.7 (0.213) 13.6 (0.212) 
1999 12.5 (0.203) 12.4 (0.203) 
2000 11.9 (0.198) 11.8 (0.197) 
2001 12.5 (0.143) 12.5 (0.143) 
2002 13.3 (0.146) 13.2 (0.146)* 
2003 13.3 (0.146) 13.1 (0.145)*** 
2004 13.8 (0.147) 13.7 (0.147) 
2005 13.4 (0.145) 13.4 (0.145) 
2006 13.3 (0.143) 13.2 (0.143) 
2007 13.9 (0.145) 13.7 (0.145)** 
2008 14.2 (0.146) 14.1 (0.146) 
Notes: See the text and Table 1 for description of the poverty rates. Standard errors in  
parentheses are estimated using generalized function parameters. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey,  
1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling  
and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >.  
Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Appendix Table 1a: Nonresponse Probit Model (ASEC 1998-2002) 
  ASEC 1998 ASEC 1999 ASEC 2000 ASEC 2001 ASEC 2002 
Variable Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. 
Metro Size (100,000-249,999) 0.071 -0.079 -0.105 -0.122 -0.068 
 (0.030)* (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.027)** (0.021)** 
Metro Size (250,000-499,999) -0.03 -0.082 -0.118 -0.025 -0.047 
 -0.026 (0.025)** (0.025)** -0.025 (0.020)* 
Metro Size (500,000-999,999) -0.05 -0.065 -0.104 -0.119 -0.072 
 (0.024)* (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.018)** 
Metro Size (1,000,000-2,499,999) -0.079 -0.141 -0.063 -0.092 -0.095 
 (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
Metro Size (2,500,000-4,999,999) -0.055 -0.105 -0.077 -0.123 -0.123 
 -0.029 (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.027)** (0.022)** 
Metro Size (5,000,000+) -0.109 -0.089 -0.09 -0.158 -0.184 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.015)** 
Midwest 0.134 0.145 0.124 0.078 0.053 
 (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.015)** 
South 0.108 0.147 0.107 0.051 0.057 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.015)** 
West 0.232 0.231 0.187 0.222 0.153 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.015)** 
Household Size 0.034 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.009 
 (0.006)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)* 
Family Size -0.211 -0.164 -0.164 -0.167 -0.139 
 (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.009)** 
Age 0.013 0.026 0.033 0.046 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.013)* (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.013) 
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) 
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Age3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) 
Age4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) 
Female 0.012 -0.001 0.009 0.024 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
Black -0.236 -0.153 -0.155 -0.189 -0.138 
 (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
Native American 0.011 -0.144 0.037 -0.059 -0.012 
 (0.061) (0.057)* (0.058) (0.053) (0.038) 
Asian -0.089 -0.167 -0.119 -0.182 -0.134 
 (0.039)* (0.037)** (0.038)** (0.035)** (0.025)** 
Married, Spouse Absent 0.089 -0.011 0.058 0.015 0.03 
 (0.032)** (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) 
Previously Married 0.121 0.087 0.09 0.082 0.078 
 (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.015)** 
Never Married 0.073 0.001 0.055 0.053 0.013 
 (0.023)** (0.022) (0.022)* (0.022)* (0.017) 
Elementary School 0.105 0.117 0.132 0.063 0.093 
 (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.028)* (0.024)** 
Some High School 0.057 0.04 0.049 0.024 -0.014 
 (0.023)* (0.023) (0.023)* (0.023) (0.018) 
Some College 0.04 0.08 0.055 0.047 0.067 
 (0.019)* (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.014)** 
Associate's Degree 0.079 0.059 0.1 0.061 0.066 
 (0.026)** (0.025)* (0.025)** (0.025)* (0.019)** 
BA Degree 0.062 0.082 0.074 0.067 0.085 
 (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.016)** 
MS Degree 0.153 0.132 0.081 0.09 0.142 
 (0.033)** (0.031)** (0.031)** (0.031)** (0.024)** 
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Professional Degree -0.07 -0.071 -0.063 0.032 0.022 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.041) 
PhD Degree -0.08 -0.006 0.024 0.128 0.127 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)* (0.046)** 
Private Worker -0.467 -0.682 -0.634 -0.657 -0.534 
 (0.106)** (0.101)** (0.104)** (0.106)** (0.083)** 
Federal Worker -0.302 -0.55 -0.458 -0.542 -0.41 
 (0.098)** (0.092)** (0.096)** (0.099)** (0.078)** 
State Worker -0.328 -0.593 -0.489 -0.561 -0.446 
 (0.112)** (0.106)** (0.109)** (0.111)** (0.087)** 
Local Government Worker -0.402 -0.543 -0.526 -0.543 -0.472 
 (0.109)** (0.103)** (0.107)** (0.109)** (0.085)** 
Self-Employed -0.92 -1.047 -1.036 -1.055 -0.923 
 (0.107)** (0.102)** (0.106)** (0.108)** (0.085)** 
Weeks worked last year -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Hours worked per week last year 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign Born, U.S. Citizen -0.05 -0.011 0.067 -0.039 -0.039 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)* (0.028) (0.023) 
Foreign Born, Not a U.S. Citizen 0.026 0.03 0.036 -0.028 -0.049 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020)* 
Executive, Administrative, & Managerial -0.095 0.159 0.1 -0.034 -0.027 
 (0.100) (0.093) (0.098) (0.099) (0.078) 
Professional Specialty -0.038 0.2 0.1 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.101) (0.094)* (0.098) (0.100) (0.079) 
Technicians and related support 0.008 0.24 0.12 0.059 0.007 
 (0.106) (0.099)* (0.103) (0.105) (0.083) 
Sales -0.142 0.074 -0.007 -0.088 -0.103 
 (0.101) (0.094) (0.098) (0.100) (0.079) 
Administrative Support -0.094 0.177 0.061 -0.019 -0.061 
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 (0.100) (0.093) (0.097) (0.099) (0.078) 
Private Household -0.102 0.082 -0.097 -0.248 -0.166 
 (0.133) (0.131) (0.126) (0.130) (0.106) 
Protective Services -0.081 0.231 0.114 -0.073 -0.079 
 (0.110) (0.104)* (0.108) (0.109) (0.086) 
Service -0.119 0.115 -0.02 -0.042 -0.04 
 (0.101) (0.094) (0.099) (0.101) (0.079) 
Farming, Forestry, & Fishing -0.031 0.147 0.015 -0.094 -0.141 
 (0.106) (0.100) (0.103) (0.105) (0.083) 
Precision Production: Craft and Repair -0.051 0.185 0.065 0.007 0.000 
 (0.100) (0.094)* (0.098) (0.100) (0.079) 
Machine Operators, Assemblers, & Inspectors -0.043 0.242 0.105 0.049 0.006 
 (0.103) (0.096)* (0.101) (0.103) (0.081) 
Transportation & Material Moving -0.003 0.198 0.05 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.104) (0.097)* (0.101) (0.103) (0.081) 
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, & 
Laborers -0.131 0.065 -0.02 -0.041 -0.097 
 (0.105) (0.098) (0.102) (0.104) (0.082) 
Constant 1.54 1.359 1.35 1.207 1.56 
 (0.162)** (0.145)** (0.156)** (0.154)** (0.135)** 
Observations 55360 55941 56599 55013 86596 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Appendix Table 1b: Nonresponse Probit Model (ASEC 2003-2009) 
 
  ASEC 2003 ASEC 2004 ASEC 2005 ASEC 2006 ASEC 2007 ASEC 2008 ASEC 2009 
Variable Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. Coeff. Est. 
Metro Size (100,000-249,999) -0.012 -0.026 -0.015 -0.034 -0.026 -0.037 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Metro Size (250,000-499,999) -0.048 -0.064 -0.062 -0.1 -0.128 -0.038 -0.009 
 (0.019)* (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020) (0.020) 
Metro Size (500,000-999,999) -0.054 -0.053 -0.051 -0.043 -0.056 -0.025 0.009 
 (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.019)* (0.019)** (0.019) (0.019) 
Metro Size (1,000,000-2,499,999) -0.058 -0.066 -0.105 -0.066 -0.097 -0.065 0.008 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016) 
Metro Size (2,500,000-4,999,999) -0.134 -0.092 -0.099 -0.065 -0.057 -0.072 -0.055 
 (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** 
Metro Size (5,000,000+) -0.157 -0.206 -0.188 -0.192 -0.108 -0.116 -0.143 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
Midwest 0.043 0.049 0.146 0.1 0.121 0.088 0.064 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
South 0.026 0.006 0.064 0.081 0.144 0.102 0.041 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
West 0.108 0.123 0.177 0.206 0.243 0.194 0.12 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
Household Size 0.022 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Family Size -0.159 -0.145 -0.174 -0.15 -0.171 -0.13 -0.176 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
Age -0.007 0.01 0 -0.007 0.039 0.015 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)** -0.014 (0.013) 
Age2 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
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Age3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
Age4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.01 0.009 -0.016 0.003 -0.028 -0.007 -0.021 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)* (0.012) (0.012) 
Black -0.118 -0.157 -0.19 -0.16 -0.168 -0.182 -0.144 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
Native American -0.008 -0.034 0.01 0.004 0.057 0.13 0.001 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)** (0.033) 
Asian -0.123 -0.2 -0.227 -0.192 -0.147 -0.148 -0.141 
 (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** 
Married, Spouse Absent 0.039 0.009 0.038 -0.015 0.084 0.028 0.049 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)** (0.025) (0.025) 
Previously Married 0.076 0.099 0.104 0.041 0.062 0.048 0.066 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
Never Married 0.011 -0.028 0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.027 0.023 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Elementary School 0.072 0.099 0.067 0.049 0.107 0.099 0.077 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.025)* (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.027)** 
Some High School 0.015 0.058 0.037 0.008 0.088 0.044 0.05 
 (0.018) (0.019)** (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)** (0.020)* (0.020)* 
Some College 0.087 0.075 0.1 0.064 0.094 0.058 0.071 
 (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
Associate's Degree 0.08 0.085 0.085 0.101 0.094 0.097 0.122 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
BA Degree 0.078 0.114 0.089 0.042 0.097 0.108 0.092 
 (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** 
MS Degree 0.148 0.15 0.129 0.108 0.108 0.188 0.152 
 (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** 
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Professional Degree 0.055 0.093 -0.045 0.034 -0.012 0.034 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.044)* (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
PhD Degree 0.119 0.075 0.098 0.159 0.082 0.105 0.146 
 (0.046)** (0.045) (0.046)* (0.047)** (0.046) (0.046)* (0.046)** 
Private Worker -0.703 -0.604 -0.568 -0.745 -0.739 -0.589 -0.686 
 (0.082)** (0.080)** (0.087)** (0.084)** (0.087)** (0.087)** (0.085)** 
Federal Worker -0.589 -0.559 -0.483 -0.624 -0.598 -0.532 -0.634 
 (0.076)** (0.075)** (0.081)** (0.078)** (0.081)** (0.082)** (0.079)** 
State Worker -0.582 -0.516 -0.469 -0.627 -0.604 -0.524 -0.602 
 (0.086)** (0.084)** (0.091)** (0.088)** (0.091)** (0.091)** (0.089)** 
Local Government Worker -0.598 -0.516 -0.456 -0.612 -0.611 -0.514 -0.629 
 (0.084)** (0.083)** (0.089)** (0.087)** (0.090)** (0.090)** (0.088)** 
Self-Employed -1.075 -0.973 -0.911 -1.067 -1.087 -0.973 -1.057 
 (0.083)** (0.082)** (0.088)** (0.086)** (0.088)** (0.088)** (0.087)** 
Weeks worked last year -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Hours worked per week last year 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) 
Foreign Born, U.S. Citizen -0.015 0.015 -0.045 -0.023 -0.044 -0.039 -0.02 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)* (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Foreign Born, Not a U.S. Citizen 0.024 0.001 -0.015 -0.051 -0.018 -0.001 0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)* (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Management 0.086 0.011 -0.13 0.119 0.162 -0.074 0.106 
 (0.077) (0.075) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082)* (0.082) (0.080) 
Business & Financial Operations 0.141 0.031 -0.041 0.186 0.168 -0.027 0.105 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.085) (0.082)* (0.085)* (0.084) (0.083) 
Computer & Mathematical 0.206 0.152 -0.01 0.232 0.325 0.052 0.22 
 (0.083)* (0.082) (0.088) (0.086)** (0.088)** (0.087) (0.086)* 
Architecture & Engineering 0.135 0.093 0.042 0.197 0.2 -0.002 0.135 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.089) (0.087)* (0.089)* (0.089) (0.087) 
Life, Physical, & Social Science 0.228 0.15 0.076 0.257 0.276 0.066 0.195 
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 (0.092)* (0.091) (0.098) (0.095)** (0.098)** (0.098) (0.097)* 
Community & Social Services  0.1 -0.047 -0.03 0.182 0.202 -0.028 0.146 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090)* (0.091)* (0.091) (0.090) 
Legal  0.041 0.011 -0.096 0.037 0.111 -0.077 0.198 
 (0.094) (0.091) (0.097) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) (0.096)* 
Education, Training, & Library 0.133 0.077 -0.045 0.168 0.228 -0.036 0.115 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.085) (0.083)* (0.085)** (0.085) (0.083) 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, & 
Media 0.073 0.03 -0.078 0.146 0.199 -0.047 0.092 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090)* (0.090) (0.088) 
Healthcare Pracitioner & Technical 0.081 0.025 -0.073 0.127 0.172 -0.019 0.067 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085)* (0.085) (0.083) 
Healthcare Support 0.034 -0.013 -0.103 0.157 0.153 -0.06 0.099 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.089) (0.086) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) 
Protective Services -0.01 -0.004 -0.134 0.107 0.081 -0.061 0.086 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) 
Food Preparation & Serving 0.024 -0.088 -0.212 0.027 0.083 -0.102 0 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.084)* (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) (0.083) 
Building, Grounds Cleaning, & 
Maintenance 0.072 0.007 -0.076 0.111 0.123 -0.152 0.054 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) 
Personal Care and Service 0.094 -0.066 -0.158 0.046 0.144 -0.037 0.062 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.086) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) (0.084) 
Sales and Related Occupations 0.01 -0.086 -0.182 0.033 0.058 -0.158 0.022 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.082)* (0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) 
Office & Administrative Support 0.091 -0.001 -0.095 0.155 0.179 -0.035 0.116 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.082) (0.079) (0.082)* (0.081) (0.080) 
Farming, Fishing, & Forestry -0.01 -0.006 -0.082 0.078 0.19 0.012 0.159 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) 
Construction Trades & Extraction 
Workers 0.048 0.015 -0.1 0.079 0.128 -0.083 0.028 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) 
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Installation, Maintenance, & Repair 0.059 0.008 -0.104 0.193 0.146 0.002 0.118 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.085) (0.083)* (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) 
Production 0.183 0.024 -0.088 0.156 0.174 -0.018 0.183 
 (0.078)* (0.076) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084)* (0.083) (0.082)* 
Transportation & Material Moving 0.097 -0.027 -0.132 0.106 0.123 -0.094 0.113 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.084) (0.081) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) 
Constant 1.573 1.513 1.597 1.628 1.12 1.39 1.487 
 (0.128)** (0.128)** (0.137)** (0.123)** (0.145)** (0.148)** (0.144)** 
Observations 86613 85363 84682 84503 83543 84223 84741 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.  For  
information on sampling and nonsampling error, see < http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration,  
Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008. 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. 
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Figure 1: Trends in Earnings and Total (Item + Supplement) 
Imputations in the ASEC among Workers 
Total Imputations Earnings Imputations 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >.   
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Figure 2: Manski Bounds on the Official Poverty Rate 
Manski Lower Bound Official Rate Manski Upper Bound 
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Figure 3: Sample W-2 Form 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings 
Record, 1997-2008. 
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Figure 4: Family Level ASEC-DER Match Rate (Earners)  
Match Rate (Overall) Match Rate (Nonrespondent) Match Rate (Respondent) 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf >. 
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Figure 5: Nonresponse Rate Across DER Earnings 
Distribution  
Workers and Nonworkers 
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Figure 6: Nonresponse Rate Across Residual Distribution  
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